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Abstract
The stability and incentives aspects of problems involving matching
subsets of two disjoint sets of agents by allocating bundles of goods
or social alternatives is discussed. It is proved that the set of stable
allocations, or the core, of any such problem is never empty and that
each set of agents has its own attainable optimal stable allocation.
Then it is demonstrated that although in general it is impossible to
construct a stable allocation mechanism which confines the problem of
manipulation to one set of agents, for a large class of problems, termed
the one-on-one matching problems, it is possible to construct an allo-
cation mechanism which always yields stable allocations and which pre-
vents any of the agents in at least one of the two sets from benefitting
from manipulation.

1. Introduction
The importance of economic models concerning the relations between
two disjoint sets of agents was recognized by many, as Shapley and
Shubik (1972) observe: "Two-sided market models are important, as
Coumot, Edgeworth, Bohm-Bawerk, and others have observed, not only for
the insights they may give into more general economic situations with
many types of traders, consumers, and producers, but also for the simple
reason that in real life many markets and most actual transactions are
in fact bilateral - i.e., bring together a buyer and a seller of a
single commodity."
This work is a study of some aspects common to many two-sided eco-
nomic and social problems, particularly the class of generalized match-
ing problems ; problems involving matching subsets of two disjoint sets
of agents by allocating bundles of goods or social alternatives.
Some of these are simple matching problems—matching men with women,
students with the colleges of their choice, etc. Some are more complex
—
matching firms with workers, where a firm may hire the same worker at
any one of various wage levels; or matching sellers, each selling a
single item in simultaneous sales, with buyers who may participate in
more than one sale. Similarly, consider producers of the same product
who are located in different markets and the problem of matching them
with consumers and a price per item which may differ from market to
market, etc.
This study is mainly concerned with the possibility of constructing
allocation mechanisms which will generate for all such problems stable
-2-
outcomes, and which will give agents the incentive to honestly reveal
their preferences over the possible outcomes.
The results derived here build on and extend a number of previous
contributions. Gale and Shapley (1962) while studying the simple match-
ing problem derived two remarkable results. They proved that for any
such problem there is always at least one stable match. (A match is
stable if no two agents from opposite sets prefer each other to their
current partners. Shapley and Shubik (1972) pointed out that the set
of stable matches is equal to the core of the cooperative game resulting
when any two agents in opposite groups can create a match if they both
agree.) They further proved that each of the two sets of agents has its
own optimal match among the stable matches, and the two are not neces-
sarily identical. Optimal means that every member of the same set
(weakly) prefers this match to any other stable match. They also con-
structed a matching procedure which always chooses the optimal match of
one of the sets of agents. Crawford and Knoer (1981) extended both
these results to the case of job matching with heterogeneous firms and
workers under conditions of perfect information, when a firm and a po-
tential employee may negotiate for wages.
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) recognized that once a
matching procedure is adopted for a simple matching problem, it becomes
a noncooperative game among the agents whose strategy choices are their
reported preferences over their potential partners. They studied the
possibility of constructing matching procedures that will always choose
stable matches and will also give incentives to all the participating
agents to reveal their true preferences, i.e., that the true preferences
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should be dominant strategies. Roth (1982) proved that no matching pro-
cedure exists which always yields a stable match and gives all agents
the incentive to honestly reveal their preferences, even though proce-
dures exist which accomplish either of these goals separately. However,
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) independently proved the sur-
prising result that matching procedures do exist which always yield the
optimal match of one of the groups of agents and which give incentives
to all agents in this group to honestly report their preferences.
Dubins and Freedman (1981) additionally proved that these procedures are
such that no coalition of agents in this group exists, whose members can
benefit by simultaneously misrepresenting their preferences.
This discussion concerns the cases of general matching problems
which involve a finite number of agents, each with a strict preference
over finite sets of alternatives. First, it will be shown that the set
of stable outcomes, or the core, of any such problem is never empty and
that each set of agents has its own attainable optimal stable outcome.
The last is again a somewhat surprising result since, e.g., it implies
that all competing buyers, in a problem of matching sellers of single
items with buyers, will prefer the same stable pairing of buyers, sellers
and items, to all other stable market allocations.
Then it will be demonstrated that in general it is impossible to
create an allocation procedure which always yields a stable outcome and
which gives all agents in one group incentives to honestly reveal their
true preferences. Nevertheless it will be proved that the Dubins and
Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) results are extendable to a large class
of problems which I term the class of one-on-one matching problems . This
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class contains the problems in which every agent is matched with at most
one agent of the opposite set and with a bundle of alternatives. Thus,
e.g., the simple matching problems, the job matching problems, and the
problems of matching sellers with unique buyers, are all one-on-one
matching problems. It will be proved for this class of problems that
allocation procedures exist which always select the optimal outcome of
one set of agents and for which no coalition of agents from this set
exists whose members can benefit by simultaneously misrepresenting their
preferences.
The formal model is described in section 2, the stability aspect
is investigated in section 3, the results on stability and incentives
are derived in section 4 and their significance is discussed in section 5.
2. Formulation
Let W and F be two disjoint sets of m and n agents respectively.
For every i e W and j e F let A. and B. be finite nonempty sets of al-
ternatives available to agents i and j respectively. Every set of al-
ternatives A. contains a null alternative a which stands for the option
1 o
*^
of "i does not participate." Similarly every B. contains a null alter-
native b-^ . A social outcome or group allocation is an (n+m) - vector
X = (x.
,
. .
.
,x
,y, , . . . ,y ) £ A, X. . .X A x B, x. . .x B . An outcome X is
i. ml ni ml n
a feasible outcome if for every i e W, x. e {y^ ,. . . ,y } U {a } and for^—__—
_
lino
every jcF, y. e {x-,...,x } U{b-'}. Let S denote the set of all feasible
social outcomes.
For i e W and j e F let Z. and Q.. be the sets of all antisymmetric,
1 J
transitive, and complete binary relations on A. and B. respectively. An
element p e Z.(q e n.) represents the preferences of individual i (j)
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over his set of alternatives. Thus xp.y means agent i strictly prefers
alternative x to alternative y etc. Agent i e W (j e F) is said to
prefer social outcome X to social outcome X' if he prefers x. to xl11
(y. to y! ). Thus agents may not be indifferent between alternatives,
but they are indifferent between any two social outcomes which allocate
to them the same alternative. A profile of preferences P is an
(n+m) - vector P = (Pi,...,p 3Q-, ,• »• ,q) e 2, x...x E x Q- x...x Q .1 m'^1' Ti 1 ml n
A generalized matching problem is the problem of associating profiles
with feasible social outcomes.
Notice that the above definitions imply that if an agent prefers
alternative x to alternative y, then he prefers every feasible group al-
location that allocates to him x to every feasible group allocation that
allocates to him alternative y. Thus any problem in which agents can
take into consideration their preferences over coalitions of agents that
share with them a group allocation, is ruled out of the scope of this
paper (see example 6).
All problems discussed here from now on are assumed to be gener-
alized matching problems. A generalized matching problem is a
one-on-one matching problem if every feasible social outcome X e S is
such that for every i e W, x, is either a or there exists exactly one
j e F such that y. = x., and for every j e F either y. = b or there
exists exactly one i e W such that x. = y.. An allocation procedure G
is a function G: L, x . ., < I x^, x... xfi -»-S, which chooses a
1 ml n '
feasible outcome for any profile of preferences. Thus allocation pro-
cedures are the institutional arrangements by which a generalized match-
ing problem is solved.
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To illustrate some of the above notations and some of the problems
included in the scope of this work, consider the following examples.
Example 1 . A simple matching problem (A marriage problem).
Let W = {1,2} and F = {1,2,3} be sets of men and women respectively.
Then for i=l,2, A^ = {(i,I)
,
(i,2")
,
(i,3) ,a^} and for j=l,2,I,
B. = {(Ijj) »(2,j) ,b^} where an ordered pair (i,j) stands for—man i mar-
ried to woman j. Thus, ((1,1) , (2,2") , (1,1) , (2,1) ,b^) is an example of a
feasible outcome which indicates man 1 married to woman 1, man 2 married
to woman 2, and woman 3 is not married.
Example 2 . Job matching .
Let W = {1,2,3} and F = {1,2} be sets of workers and firms respec-
tively. Assume each firm has one job opening and it can hire each
worker at one of two different wage levels. Then for i e W,
A^ = {x(i,l),y(i,l),x(i,2),y(i,2),aj} and for j e F,
B^ = {x(l,j),y(l,j),x(2,j),y(2,j),x(3,j),y(3,j),b^} where x(i,j) stands
for— 'worker i hired by firm j at the lower level of wages', while
y(i,j) stands for— 'worker i hired by firm j at the higher level of
wages', A feasible outcome for example, is (x(l,2),a ,y(3,l) ,y(3,l) ,x(l,2))
which states that the first worker is hired by the second firm at the
lower level of salary, the third worker is hired by the first firm at
the higher level, while the second worker is unemployed.
Example 3 . Simultaneous sales
Let W = {1,2,3} and F = {1,2} be sets of buyers and sellers
respectively. Assume that each seller is selling a single item, each
buyer is endowed with a finite amovint of indivisible goods that can be
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traded for the auctioned items, and may participate in both sales; and
that each buyer may buy at most, one item. In this case
A^ = {a^,(a^,j) ^\»J^ ^°^ j=1.2} where (a^j^.j) stands for— 'a^
J.U 2 — —
traded for the j item', A_ = {a , (b. ,j) ,, . . , (b ,j) for j=l,2} and
A^ = {a^,(Cj^,j),...,(c2,j) for j=l,2} while for j e F,
B. = {(a^,j),...,(aj^,j),(bj^,j),...,(b^,j),(c^,j),...,(c2,j),b^}. Thus
an example of a feasible outcome is (a
,
(b_,2)
,
(c^,!)
,
(c2,l)
,
(b«,2))
which translates into: The second buyer bought the second item 'paying'
b_ while the third buyer bought and paid c^ for the first item.
All the above are examples of one-on-one matching problems. The
following two are examples of generalized matching problems which are
not one-on-one problems.
Example 4 . Multiple markets of a single product .
Let F = {1,2,3} be a set of three different producers of the same
product, each located at a different market, and let W = {1,2,3,4,5}
be a set of five consumers for this product. Assume that producers
and consumers negotiate for the price per item, in such manner that
all consumers who buy from the same producer, pay the same price. In
this case for i e W, A^ = {a^, (p , j) ,. . . , (p ,j ) for j e F}
and for j e F, B. = {(p, ,j) (Pv.)j),b } where p^ to p, is a finite
list of possible prices and (p.,j) indicates that price p is paid in
market j . Then an example of a feasible outcome is
((P3,2),(p3,2),(p2,l),(P3,3),a^,(P2,l),(P3,2),(p^,3)) indicating that
consumers one and two buy from the second producer paying p per item,
the third consumer buys from the first producer paying p„ , the fourth
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consumer buys from the third producer paying p^ per item, while the last
consumer decided not to participate.
Example 5 .
Consider a department which is trying to fill up to three open posi-
tions at the junior level, and which has already identified three candi-
dates, all of whom are identically qualified. The only obstacle to
signing the three is the department's rule that all starting employees
will agree to the same package of benefits—which may include a combina-
tion of salary, retirement payment, insurance, working load, etc. The
department is indifferent between hiring one, two or all three.
Let F = {1}, W = {1,2,3} represent the department and the candi-
dates respectively. Let A = {a,b,c} be a set of three available pack-
ages. Then for i e W, A. = A U {a } and B— = A U {b }, and e.g., a
3feasible outcome is (b,b,a ,b) which stands for: the first and second
candidates agreed to package b, while the third candidate decided to
go somewhere else.
The following example is the case of a matching problem which is
not even a generalized matching problem.
Example 6 . Multiple matches .
Let F and W be sets of universities and candidates for faculty
positions respectively. Suppose the number of candidates a university
may hire depends on the combination of candidates which it can attract.
E.g., suppose the first university would like to hire candidates 1, 2
and 3. But if this is not possible it would rather hire candidates 4
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and 5 than any other combination of candidates 1, 2 and 3. This is a
problem that cannot be stated as a generalized matching problem,
3. Stability
A social outcome x is said to be unstable given profile P if any
of the following three conditions exists: (i) there exists an agent
k —k e W U F such that a P-x, ; (ii) there exist i £ W, j e F and alternative
X e A. n B. such that xp.x. and xq.y.; or (iii) there exist
i E W, j e F and alternative x e A. n b. such that either x = x. and
1 J 1
xq .y. or xp.x. and x = y.. An outcome is stable given P if it is not
3 2 1 1 2
unstable. This terminology is motivated by the assumption that agents
cannot be compelled to accept an outcome, thus any agent can elect not
to participate, if he prefers this to what is allocated to him and any
two agents of opposite sets can create a match if there is an alternative
which both prefer to their current allocation. It is easy to verify that
the set of stable outcomes is the core of the cooperative game that re-
sults under these assumptions.
A stable outcome is W-op timal (F-optimal) if every agent in W (in F)
(weakly) prefers it to any other stable outcome. '
An allocation procedure G is a stable allocation procedure if for
every profile P, the outcome G(P) is a stable outcome. The following
two theorems are generalizations of the results derived by Gale and
Shapley (1962) for the simple matching problem and the results derived
by Crawford and Knoer (1981) for the job matching problem in a discrete
market (theorems 1 and 3). The proofs are modifications of Gale and
Shapley *s original discussions.
-10-
Theorem 1
The stable outcomes set of any generalized matching problem is
never empty.
Proof ;
The following is a description of an allocation procedure G which
o
is a generalization of the Gale and Shapley (1962) assignment procedure.
It will be proved that this procedure is a stable allocation procedure.
(Notice that although the procedure is described with W and F "playing"
different roles, the algorithm doesn't lose its generality, since W and
F are interchangeable. The only difference is that a different stable
outcome may be chosen.)
Step ; Every agent j e F is assigned the null alternative b-'.
Step 1 ; a. Every i e W offers his most preferred alternative (if dif-
ferent from a ) to all agents in F, for whom it is feasible,
b. Each agent j £ F rejects all but his most preferred alter-
native among those suggested to him, including b-^
.
•
Step k ; a. Every agent i e W who has been "rejected" in step k-1, of-
fers his most preferred alternative among those not yet re-
jected (if different from a ) to all the agents in F for
whom it is feasible (an agent is said to be rejected if
all the agents in F to whom he offered his alternative re-
jected it). If his most preferred alternative is a he
o
ceases to participate in the process.
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b. Each agent j e F rejects all but his most preferred alter-
native among those alternatives offered to him in step k
and the alternative he kept from step k-1.
The procedure terminates when no more agents are rejected
Since the numbers of agents in both W and F are finite and since
all alternative sets are also finite, G must terminate with a feasible
o
social outcome in a finite number of steps.
Suppose there exists a profile of preferences P such that X = G (P)
is not a stable outcome. This indicates that there is a feasible social
outcome X and there are agents i £ W and j e F such that x.p.Xj, y.q.y.
1 i i J J J
A A
and X. = y. (notice that the way the procedure is defined, X cannot be
unstable due to an agent's preference not to participate rather than ac-
cept his X allocation nor due to condition (iii) in the definition of
A
_^ A
unstable allocations), x.p.x. implies that i offered x. to individual i
(possibly to other agents in F as well). Since y. # x. it implies that
A ^ A
agent j rejected x. at one stage, hence y.q.x., a contradiction. This
proves that G is stable,
o
Q.E.D.
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Theorem 2
There is always a stable outcome which is W-optimal and a stable
outcome which is F-optimal,
Proof ;
It will be proved that the outcome of the G procedure is always
o
the optimal outcome for W, the set of agents which offer the alterna-
tives. Thus by exchanging the roles of W and F, the theorem can be
fully proved.
The proof is by induction. An alternative x is possible for
Ci,j) e W X F (given P) if there exists a stable outcome X such that
x-=x=y.. An alternative x is possible for i e W if there exists j e F
such that X is possible for Cijj)- Suppose that up to step k-1 in the
G procedure, no possible outcome for an agent in W is rejected, and
that at step k agent i e W is rejected when offering alternative x,
i.e., that every agent j e F to whom x was offered rejected it either
because he prefers b to x or because alternative y, which he prefers to
X, was offered to him. If j prefers b^ to x, obviously x is not possible
for (ijj). On the other hand, if y, such that yq.x, was offered to j by
Ji £ W (among others perhaps), this indicates that I prefers y to any
(other) possible alternative for himself (this by the induction assump-
tion) and therefore any social outcome that allocates alternative x to
i and j is unstable given P (because of £, j and y), which means that x
is not possible for (i,j). Since this is true for every j e F that x
was offered to, it means that x is not possible for i. By induction,
this proves that no possible alternative for agents in W is ever
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rejected in the G procedure. Therefore for any given profile P, G (P)
is (weakly) preferred by all agents in W to any other possible outcome.
hence G (P) is W-optimal.
Q.E.D.
4. Incentives and Stability
An allocation procedure is said to be manipulable if there exists
an agent k, either in W or in F, a profile of preferences P and p, such
A ^ A A
that if X = G(P) and X = G(P_, |p, ) then x.p,x, . (^_],|Pi, stands for the
profile derived from the profile P where p, replaces p, .) An allocation
procedure is a straightforward procedure (or incentive compatible) if it
is not manipulable: if none of the agents can benefit by misrepresenting
his true preferences on his alternatives. Thus no agent has the incen-
tive not to honestly reveal his preferences. To put it differently, an
allocation procedure is straightforward if in the resulting noncoopera-
tive game among the agents (where strategy choices are preferences and
payoffs are the outcomes), revealing his true preferences is a dominant
strategy for every participating agent. An allocation procedure G is
W-group (F-group) manipulable if there exist a coalition K C w (K C F)
,
A A
a profile P and p, (q, ) for every k e K, such that if X = G(P) and
A AAA
^ ""
^^^-k'\^ ^^^^ ^^k^ ^Vk\^ ^°^ every k e K.
An allocation is W-straightforward (F-straightforward) if it is
not W-group (F-group) manipulable.
In this section we investigate the possibility of constructing
stable and straightforward procedures for the generalized matching prob-
lem. The focus of interest in stable allocation mechanisms is that the
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outcoraes they generate are always Pareto-ef ficient and they eliminate
the need to compel the participating agents to accept these outcomes;
once a stable allocation is chosen, no coalition of agents can do better
by disregarding the allocation procedure. The appeal of straightforward
procedures is that they minimize the amount of information agents need
to accumulate and report for the procedure to operate properly. Actu-
ally all an agent needs to know is his own true preferences. This is
especially important when combined with additional requirements, such
as the requirement for efficient or stable outcomes. Although the re-
sulting outcomes are efficient and/or stable when agents report truth-
fully, the outcomes may not possess these properties when agents mis-
represent their preferences. The following two theorems are immediate
extensions of results reported in Roth (1981) , therefore the proof of
theorem 3 is omitted and the proof of theorem 4 follows closely his dis-
cussion.
The first theorem states that it is impossible to construct a
straightforward allocation procedure which always yields a stable out-
come for the generalized matching problem, while the second theorem
demonstrates that there do exist efficient straightforward mechanisms
2)
which are not stable.
Theorem 3 ;
No stable straightforward allocation procedures exist for all gen-
eralized matching problems.
Once the requirement of stability is dropped, it is easy to con-
struct a Pareto-efficient and straightforward allocation procedure by
implementing a lexicographically dictatorial rule.
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Theorem 4 ;
There exist Pareto-efficient and straightforward procedures for
the generalized matching problems
.
Proof ;
Consider the following procedure.
For any profile P of preferences:
Step 1 : Agent 1 in W is allocated his most preferred alternative.
Step k ; Agent k e W gets his most preferred alternative among
those still feasible for him (an alternative x is still
feasible for agent k if either x = a orifxEA,i^B.
for some j e F and either x is already allocated to j (be-
cause of some agent i e F, i < k) or j is still free.) ,a
•
Step m+1 ; All agents in F which are still with no allocation are
allocated their null alternative. This is a lexico-
graphically dictatorial allocation procedure which is
therefore a straightforward procedure and clearly its
outcomes are always Pareto-efficient
.
Q.E.D.
Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) demonstrated that by ex-
ploiting the special two-sided structure of the simple matching problem,
the difficulties with manipulability can be confined to one group of
agents.
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They proved that the matching procedure which always chooses the
optimal match of one set of agents, say the W set, is a stable W-
3)
straightforward procedure.
The following theorem demonstrates that in general it is impos-
sible to confine all the difficulties with manipulability to one set of
agents .,
Theorem 5 ;
No stable allocation procedure for all generalized matching prob-
lems is also W-straightforward (F-straightforward)
.
Proof ;
The proof is by example. Let W = {1,2}, F = {1}, A = {a,b,c},
A^ = A U {a-'"}, A2 = A U {a^} and Bj = A u {b""-}. Suppose G is a stable
allocation procedure. Let P-, ,p{ e 2-, » Po»Po ^ ^o> I1 e JV be as follows:11 2 2 1
ap^bp^cp^a^, bp^a^p^apj^c, bp2cp2ap2a^, bp^a^p^cp^a and cq^aq^bqb^. Since
the set of stable allocations for (p, jP^jq-i) is {(c,c,c)}, for (p,',P2fq-i)
is {b,b,b),(a ,c,c) } and for (p,',?!*^-,) it is {(b,b,b)}, therefore it
must be G((p^,p2,q^) ) = (c,c,c) and G( (pj^,p^,q^) ) = (b,b,b). If
G((p' p q )) = (b,b,b), then G is manipulable by agent 1, since bp-c,
while if G((p*,p
,q )) = (a ,c,c), then G is manipulable by agent 2
2
since bp cp«a . Hence no stable allocation procedure is also
W-straightforward for this problem.
Q.E.D.
The above theorem rules out the possibility of constructing any
stable allocation procedure, let alone a W or F optimal procedure, for
all the generalized matching problems which also limit the possibility
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of manipulation to one set of agents. Nevertheless as the following
theorem will demonstrate, there is a large class of generalized matching
problems, for which it is possible to construct W (or F) optimal alloca-
tion procedures, the class of one-on-one matching problems, which
eliminate the possibility of manipulations by agents in W (or F),
To prove the main result the following two lemmas are needed.
A coalition K C W (K C F) is said to manipulate simply if there
exists P, P = (P „,P„), X = G(P) and X = G(P), such that for every k e K,
A A A
X, p, X, and x, p, y for every other y £ A, .
4)Lemma 1 ;
If a coalition K C W (K C F) can manipulate G , it can manipulate
it simply.
Proof ;
A
Without loss of generality assume K = {l,2,.«.,k} C W and X, X, P,
A A A A A
and P are such that P = P JP , X = G (P) , X = G (P) and for every i e K
x.p.x. . Let P = P „|P,, where for every i e K, p. e E. is such that1*^1 i -K' K ^ ' '^i 1
A <«
x.p.y for every other y e A..
A ••
Observe that X is stable given P. If not, then there would exist
** A MA
i e W, i e F and x e A, n b. such that xp.x. and xq.y.. This implies
M A M A A
that i e K (if i ^ K then p. = p. and q. = q. which implies that X is
A AM
imstable in P) but by assumption x.p.y for every y e A
,
, a contradiction.
Let X = G (P) , then by theorem 2, X is W-optimal in P, hence it must be
X. = X. for every i e K, which completes the proof that K can manipulate
simply.
Q.E.D.
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Lenrnia 2 ;
If a social outcome X is the result of simple manipulation of G
,
by a coalition in W (in F) , then every agent in W (in F) (weakly) pre-
fers his allocation in X to his allocation in X—the outcome before
manipulation.
Proof ;
Suppose this is not the case. Then there exists coalition K C W,
profiles P and P and social outcomes X and X such that X = G (P)
,
X = G (P), P is the profile generated when every agent in K manipulates
simply, and for at least one agent i e W, i i K, x.p.x.. This implies
that when G is operating on P, at least one agent in W offered an al-
ternative he did not offer when G operated on P, to at least one agent
in F. Let il, e W be one of the first agents to do so (all of them
during the same step in G ) and let this alternative be y e A .
Obviously 2, ^ K, hence p = p and therefore x p y. This implies that
every agent j e F who accepted x in X (i.e., y. = x ), rejects x be-
cause a better alternative is offered to him now, but then this must be
an alternative that wasn't offered to him in the case of P, which con-
tradicts the assumption that £ was one of the first agents to offer a
new alternative.
'-
.
• Q.E.D.
Theorem 6 ;
The allocation procedure which always selects the W-optimal (F-
optimal) outcome is a W-straightforward (F-straight forward) procedure
for all one-on-one-matching problems.
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Proof :
Notice that the theorem is phrased in terms of "The allocation
procedure...". There are obviously different procedures which select
the same outcomes. From the point of view of manipulation all such
procedures are equivalent, and can be regarded as a single allocation
procedure.
The proof is by induction. Suppose there exists a coalition K C W
which can manipulate the G procedure for a one-on-one matching
problem. Then, by lemma 1, this coalition can manipulate simply and in
this case, by lemma 2, every agent in W (weakly) prefers the alternative
allocated to him in the second case to the alternative allocated to him
in the first case (I will refer to the case of no manipulation as the
first case and to the case of simple manipulation as the second case)
.
This implies that no agent in W offered an alternative in the second
case which he didn't offer in the first case. Suppose the number of
steps which took place in the execution of the G procedure in the first
case is t. Observe that all agents in F which accepted alternatives in
step t, actually accepted the first offer they preferred to "not par-
ticipating". Since no agent in W offers a new alternative in the second
case and since in every one-on-one matching problem the number of active
participants is the same in both groups of agents—we must conclude that
every agent in W which offered an alternative to an agent in F during
step t in the first case, must offer the same alternative to the same
agent in the second case, hence he doesn't belong to K. Suppose every
agent in W that reached his final alternative, in the first case, be-
tween steps k+1 and t ends up with the same alternative (and the same
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agent in F) , and therefore does not belong to K. Suppose i e W stops
at step k, sharing alternative y with agent j e F. Let D be the set
of all alternatives rejected byj
,
in the first case, and suppose alter-
native z is his most preferred alternative in D. If z 5^ b , then it
was offered to j by some agent i^ e W, which indicates that i^ reaches
his final allocation after step k, hence by the assumption reaches the
same alternative in the second case. This implies that agent i.
offers z to agent j also in the second case, which indicates that
alternative y must be offered to j by i , (since this is the only al-
o 00 ^
tentative offered to j which he prefers to z, and no new alternatives
were offered) hence i and j share the alternative y in the second00. o
case too, or - i ^ K. If z = b , it indicates that i was the first
o o o
and last agent in W to offer an alternative to j which he prefers to
b in the first case. Since j must participate in the second case
too, (because of the one-on-one condition) and since no new alternatives
are offered in the second case, it again implies that i and j are
sharing y in the second case, hence i ^ K. By induction this proves
that K is an empty coalition, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 1 (Dubins and Freedman (1981))
The Gale-Shapley assignment procedure is a stable W-straight forward
(F-straightforward) procedure for the simple matching problems.
Consider the job matching problem, introduced in example 2, of
matching workers with firms which may hire each worker at one of differ-
ent wage levels. By extending the notations introduced in example 2,
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it is easy to demonstrate that this is a one-on-one matching problem
thus:
Corollary 2 ;
The G allocation procedure is W-straightforward for the job
matching problems.
Example 3 introduces the problem of selecting unique buyers for
a number of simultaneous sales of single items. Again, by extending
the notation introduced there, to the general case, it is easy to prove
that this is also a one-on-one matching problem.
Corollary 3 :
The G allocation procedure is a W-straightforward procedure
for the simultaneous sales problem.
The above corollaries emphasize a number of one-on-one matching
problems for which it is possible to confine the difficulties with
manipulations to one group of agents. Thus implementation of the G
o
procedure in each of these problems will create the institutional mech-
anism which will always choose a stable allocation as an outcome and
which will eliminate the possibility of strategic behavior by at least
one group of agents. E.g., implementing the G procedure as the method
by which buyers bid for items in the simultaneous sales problem, will
cause the buyers' optimal allocation always to be the market outcome
—
and will give all the buyers the incentive always to reveal their true
preferences.
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5. Conclusions
It was demonstrated that the two-sided structure of the models dis-
cussed here, allows for some important and surprising results. Theorem 1
proves the existence of stable allocations for every generalized matching
problem. Theorem 2 proves that each group of agents has a stable outcome
which all its members prefer to any other stable allocation—which is a
counter intuitive conclusion since agents in the same group compete with
each other and are not expected to agree on a most preferred final outcome.
Theorem 2 also suggests ways to reach these "optimal points" since imple-
mentation of the G procedure can serve as the institutional mechanism
which will yield these allocations.
It was also proved that for all one-on-one matching problems these
procedures restrict the temptation of manipulation to one group of agents
only. Thus the difficulties with manipulation can be eliminated from
problems where one group is either a group of regulated agents or public
institutions.
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Footnotes
1. The weak dominance definition (see Roth and Postlewaite (1977)) is
used here in order to avoid stable allocations which are not Pareto
optimal.
2. Roth's (1982) impossibility result is of the same nature as the
Gibbard and Satterthwaite impossibility results for constructing
Pareto-efficient, non-dictatorial and straightforward social
choice rules. The impossibility of constructing such social choice
rules (with additional assumptions on the domains of preferences)
was proved in a number of works (e.g., see Gibbard (1973),
Satterthwaite (1975), Kalai and Muller (1977), Maskin (1976) and
Ritz (1981) for analysis of the different cases).
3. Roth (1982) proved that it is W-straightforward for all "coalitions"
of one agent.
4. Roth (1982) uses similar lemmas to prove his theorem 5. By proving
that it is impossible that every man will find a better match, he
proves the impossibility of simple manipulation and thus of any
kind of manipulation (by a single man) for the simple matching
problem.
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